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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
RIGHT OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION TO SUE UPON CONTRACTS
IN MONTANA COURTS-DOING BUSINESS-FAILURE TO
QUALIFY-SUBSEQUENT QUALIFICATION.
INTRODUCTION
Anyone who is at all familiar with corporation law is probably
aware of the maxim that corporations are "creatures of statute," and as
such, their rights, duties, and powers are limited by the statutory pro-
visions of the particular state under which it is chartered. Perhaps less
well known is the duty of a corporation to comply with certain "qualifi-
cation" statutes when it does business in a jurisdiction other than the
state of incorporation. The recent Montana case of Greene Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. Morris' provides a good illustration of the severe conse-
quences which can, and often do result from a failure to meet these
qualification requirements. That case held that an Idaho corporation
which had built a motel in Montana without qualifying to do business,
was not entitled to enforce mechanics liens against the motel. This de-
cision was one step beyond the general rule of merely treating contracts
made by non-qualifying foreign corporations as unenforceable. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court concluded that an enforceable lien must be based
on a valid contract; and since the contracts here were not enforceable,
neither were the liens.
2
Generally speaking, the effect of non-compliance leads to a variety
of results, depending upon the statutes of the different states. At least
forty-five states and the District of Columbia regard a failure to qualify
as a bar to recovery in a suit by the foreign corporation upon a contract
with a resident of that state.3 The majority of these jurisdictions, how-
ever, allow removal of the bar by subsequent qualification. 4 Montana
law in this regard is unsettled, there never having been a state decision
on the effect of subsequent compliance with the statutes. However, in
1395 P.2d 252 (Mont. 1964). See in this regard, the Michigan case of Bilt-More
Homes, Inc. v. French, 130 N.W. 2d 907 (1964), which denied a foreign corporation
the right to foreclose a construction lien because it had failed to (1) qualify to do
business, and (2) had failed to obtain a valid builder's license. The court deined
relief in spite of the fact that the corporation had been mistakenly issued a license
by the Michigan Corporation and Securities Commission; since the corporation had
failed to qualify, no valid license could have been issued, and thus the one issued
by mistake was null and void.
2Green Plnbing & Heating Co., supra note 1, at 259.
'Statutory Restrictions on Enforcement of Contracts, 23 CORP. J. 323, (1963). It
should be noted that suits on other causes of action may be permitted, such as to
protest a tax levy, or to protect its property from other threats. Powder River Cattle
Co. v. Custer County, 9 Mont. 145, 22 Pac. 383, 384 (1889). See also a federal
district court case where the plaintiff was allowed to make a recission of the con-
tract, and seek restitution on equitable grounds. Pellerin Laundry Machinery Sales
Co. v. Hogue, 219 F. Supp. 629 (D. Ark. 1963).
4Thirty six states and the District of Columbia allow the corporation to bring suit
upon subsequent filing. These states are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missisippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 23 CORP. J., supra note 3, at 323-24.
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1953, a federal district court, in the case of Hutterian Brethern v. Ilaas,
interpreted the Montana statute to mean that qualification subsequent to
doing business in the state will not validate contracts made prior to the
"doing of business. ' 5 In the Greene case, there was never an attempt to
qualify, so the court was not required to rule on the question of late filing.
The Hutterian case was cited, however, indicating that Montana might
accept the federal court's interpretation of the statute involved. This dis-
cussion will examine some of the preliminary matters in this area, and will
attempt to explain why the Hutterian decision should not be followed by
Montana courts.
DOING BUSINESS
In arriving at the decision in the Greene case, the Montana court first
had to conclude that the plaintiff corporation was "doing business"
within the state. Although no actual definition of the term was given in
Greene, an earlier case, State ex rel. American Laundry v. District Court,
explained "doing business" in these terms:
In a general way it may be said that the business must be such
in character and extent as to warrant the inference that the cor-
poration has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the
district in which it is served, and in which it is bound to appear
when a proper agent has been served with process. * * * *
It has been said that 'doing business' implies ... such as might be
evinced by the investment of capital in the state, with the main-
tenance of an office for the transaction of business and these
identical circumstances which attest the corporate intent to
avail itself of the privilege to carry on a business.6
'Hutterian Brethren of Wolf Creek v. Haas, 116 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mont. 1953).
'State ex rel. American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Second Judicial District Court,
98 Mont. 278, 41 P.2d 26, 29 (1934). Here the court, in determining whether the
corporation was doing such business in the state as to require qualification, adopted
the same test as used to determine if a corporation is sufficiently present in the
state to effectuate service of process. This position was reaffirmed by a recent
Montana federal district court decision, which stated, '"In Montana the meaning of
the term 'doing business in the state' is the same for regulation of corporations as
for service of process, and the same tests are applied in determining whether a cor-
poration is doing business in the state." Minnehoma Financial Co. v. Van Oosten,
198 F. Supp. 200, 203 (D. Mont. 1961), citing State ex rel. American Laundry Co.,
supra.
Montana is clearly in a minority in this respect; normally, different tests are
applied to determine whether a state may (1) levy a tax on the corporation, (2)
subject it to service of process, or (3) require it to qualify before doing business
in the state. Three Kinds of Doing Business, 23 CoRp. J. 163, (1962). This article
said at 163:
The greatest amount of business activity is required to subject a cor-
poration to the qualification requirements. Where a corporation's activi-
ties in a state are sufficient to require qualification, it follows that the
corporation will also be amenable to service of process in the state and to
the taxing jurisdiction of the state.
The tests applied by the courts to decide these questions vary. In a
very general way it can be stated that the question of service of process
on an unlicensed foreign corporation turns on 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice', and that jurisdiction of the state to tax an
unlicensed foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce
depends on the corporation's "nexus" with the state.
See also, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
1965]
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From a reading of the Greene decision, one is left with the conclusion
that the term refers to any activity by a foreign corporation which is not
classified as interstate commerce, or which fails to qualify under the
"single transaction" rule. Early federal cases have established that the
states may not regulate the activities of corporations engaged strictly in
interstate commerce. The United States Court ofAppeals in 1906 stated:
[A] corporation not created under the laws of a state, or not do-
ing business in that state under conditions that subject it to
process from the courts of that state, is within the meaning of
the provision of the fourteenth constitutional amendment, declar-
ing that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws". . . . Nor will such state statutes
be permitted to interfere with the Constitutional rights of Con-
gress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states."
7
The court in the Greene case gave full recognition to the interstate com-
merce exception, when it stated: "for this court to find that Lindsey and
plaintiff. ...violated sections 15-1701 and 15-1703, supra, it is necessary
to find that (1) Lindsey and plaintiff were 'doing business' within Mon-
tana ... and (2) that they were not excluded from complying with the
above statutes due to the fact of their activities being interstate com-
merce. . . ."s Further, it was said that: "A state is without power to
exact conditions or place burdens upon the exercise of interstate com-
merce."9 It is also important to note that the mere fact a corporation
is engaged in interstate commerce will not excuse it from qualifying if it
also conducts activities that are purely local in character. 10
If a corporation is engaged in both interstate and intrastate business,
it must meet the qualification requirements to protect the validity of its
local contracts. However, Montana does recognize that if the activity is
"incidental" to interstate commerce, it remains within the protection of
the commerce clause of the Constitution.11 Quite obviously, a fine line
exists between purely local activity, and that which is incidental to inter-
state commerce. Since the question of "doing business," at least in Mon-
tana, is left to the court to determine, 12 this is an area where foreign cor-
porations will be at the mercy of the trial judge's discretion.
7Kirven v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 145 Fed. 288, 292 (4th Cir. 1906). See also
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898). However, this does not prevent the states
from requiring the corporation to appoint an agent, upon whom service of process
can be served. The corporation is not immune from service of process even if it is
engaged only in interstate commerce. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579 (1914).




""The determination whether plaintiff was doing business in the state of Montana
within the purview of section 15-1701 . . . were questions of law . . . . I Union
Interchange Inc. v. Parker, 138 Mont. 348, 357 P.2d 339, 343 (1960). It should be
noted that this rule is not in accord with a United States Court of Appeals decision
which said, "It should have been left for the jury to find whether or not these
activities constituted the carrying on of business in Michigan." Brown v. Farmer and
OCHS Co. 209 F.2d 703, 706 (6th Cir. 1954).
[Vol. 26,
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As is true with the interstate commerce exception, when a foreign
corporation is performing an isolated transaction in a state, it is not nor-
mally required to qualify.13 Montana follows this general rule, as was
indicated in the American Laundry Case, 4 and again in the Greene de-
cision. In the former case, the court stated very simply that "Isolated
transactions do not constitute a doing of business within the meaning
of the statute; it contemplates a more or less continuing course of busi-
ness." 15 In Greene, the court acknowledged the existence of this rule, but
said it would not apply in that case, "since the general rule is that cor-
porations performing construction contracts are 'doing business' even
though they perform but a single contract, and therefore are subject to
compliance with state laws regulating the doing of business by foreign
corporations."' 6 Thus, whenever a foreign corporation comes into Mon-
tana to perform even a single construction contract, it will clearly be
proceeding at its own risk if it fails to qualify.
Depending on the wording of their particular statutes, states have
barred recovery on the basis that the contract entered into before qualifi-
cation was either completely void, or merely unenforceable. 7 Treating
the contract void, although the simpler penalty, is of course, also the more
severe. Once the contract is declared void, subsequent qualification will
not validate it. On the other hand, if a contract is merely treated as un-
enforceable, it can often be validated by meeting certain conditions.
Where the court declares the contract to be merely unenforceable, sev-
eral situations can arise: (1) The corporation may never file the proper
information. This situation is disposed of uniformly by all states; since
the contract is unenforceable without qualification, the corporation can
never expect to obtain relief. (2) The corporation may file after entering
into the contract, but before suit; thirty-seven jurisdictions will remove
1"Isolated Transactions, 23 CoRP. J. 243, (1962).
14Supra note 6, at 29.
"5Ibid. See Dover Lumber v. Whitcomb, 54 Mont. 141, 168 Pac. 947 (1917), and also
the case of Gen. Fire Extenguisher Co. v. Northwestern Auto Supply Co., 65 Mont.
371, 211 Pac. 308, 310 (1922), where the court gave the explanation that "isolated
transactions, whereby a foreign corporation sells goods or other manufactured products
on sample or specifications, the same being fabricated in another state and shipped
into this state by such corporation for use or installation, does not constitute the
doing of business in this state, within the contemplation of the statute."
"6Supra note 1, at 258. This is an understandable exception to the "isolated trans-
action" rule since normally the performance of construction contracts involves a
considerable length of time, and numerous activities are necessary to complete the
project.
"It often happens that the case law, and even some statutes do not recognize the dif-
ferent meaning of these two terms. To avoid confusion in this discussion, the term
''void'' will mean absolutely nugatory and ineffectual. The word "unenforceable"
will denote situations where the contract is not entirely nugatory, but where the
courts simply will not enforce the contract until certain conditions are met.
It is interesting to note that Alabama, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Nevada, and
Wisconsin, in addition to refusing to enforce a contract of this type, also place
restrictions on a non-qualifying corporation to defend a suit. The statutes of Nevada
and Wisconsin state that such corporations shall not be allowed to defend any action
until it shall have fully complied. The restrictions imposed by Hawaii, Maryland, and
Idaho deny the corporations the benefits of a statute of limitations. In Alabama the
corporation is not entitled to set up the defense that the contract was made in viola-
tion of law. Bight to Defend Suits, 23 CORP. J., (1963).
1965]
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the bar by qualification anytime before suit.' 8  (3) Most courts hold that
filing after suit has commenced is too late; however, a small number of
states will remove the bar, even upon qualification during the suit.19
Until recent years, it was important whether the contract was treated
as "void" or "unenforceable" when the suit reached federal courts on the
basis of diversity of citizenship. For a number of years, if the contract
were treated as void by the state court, the federal court also recognized
it as void for all purposes. However, if it were merely unenforceable in
state court, the federal court would grant relief. This is no longer the
rule. Now if the state court refuses to enforce a contract, the federal
court will likewise deny relief, regardless of whether the state treats the
contract as "void" or "unenforceable.
2 0
QUALIFICATION IN MONTANA
In examining the Montana law in this area, the logical point of de-
parture is the principal Montana statute involved, which states:
Contracts void if made before compliance with the act. If any
foreign corporation shall attempt or commence to do business
in this state without having filed -said statement, certificate,
1"23 CORP. J., supra note 3, at 323-24.
"Ibid.
21A 1905 Supreme Court case stated, in regard to a New York statute requiring a
foreign corporation to obtain a certificate to do business: "[T]he purpose of the
act was not to avoid contracts, but to provide effective supervision and control of
the business carried on by foreign corporations . . . no penalty for non-compliance
was provided, except the suspension of civil remedies in that State, and none others
would be implied." Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U.S. 458, 465 (1905). This same
view was again set forth a few years later, when the Court said in David Lupton's
Sons Co. v. Auto. Club of America, 225 U.S. 489, 499-500 (1912):
It must follow, upon the similar construction of see. 15 as it read at the
time of the transaction in question, that the Lupton Company, whether or
not it was doing a local business in New York, had the right to bring this
suit in the Federal Court. The State could not prescribe the qualifications
of suitors in the courts of the United States, and could not deprive of their
privileges those who were entitled under the Constitution and laws of the
United States to resort to the Federal courts for the enforcement of a
valid contract.
This line of thinking came to an end with Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
which held that in federal diversity suits the substantive law of the states was to be
followed. Federal courts treated the "right to sue" as a substantive right, and
denied the foreign corporation the right to sue whenever that right had been denied
in the state court. As stated in Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192 (1946):
Cases like Lupton are obsolete insofar as they are based on a view of
diversity jurisdiction which came to an end with Erie . . . That decision
drastically limited the power of federal district courts to entertain suits in
diversity cases that could not be brought in the respective State courts
or were barred by defenses controlling in the State courts.
The case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945), said that for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal court is actually only another court of
the state. And in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949), the
Court said that:
[W]here in such cases one is barred from recovery in the state court, he
should likewise be barred in the federal court. The contrary result would
create discriminations against citizens of the State in favor .of those author-
ized to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. It was that
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and consent, required by this act, or without complying with any
or all of the laws of Montana relating to the payment of fees or
licenses, no contract made by such corporation, or any agent
or agents thereof, during said time, shall be enforceable by the
corporation until the foregoing provisions have been complied
with.2
1
In attempting to establish the correct interpretation of the statute, three
questions must be answered: First, what is meant by the terms "void"
and not "enforceable"? Second, what effect does the heading of a statute
have on its over-all meaning? Third, what is meant by the phrase, "until
the foregoing provisions have been complied with"?
In answer to the first question, the term "void," in its strict sense,
"can only be applied to those contracts that are of no effect whatsoever,
such as are a mere nullity, and incapable of confirmation or ratifica-
tion. '22 A contract which is not "enforceable," on the other hand, means
something less than a complete nullity, as is evident from those states
which treat a contract as unenforceable before qualification, but which
recognize it as valid and enforceable upon subsequent qualification. 23
In a sense, an unenforceable contract is one that is dormant, but which,
by the fulfillment of certain conditions, can be converted into an agree-
ment which will support a suit to enforce rights arising under it. 24
Turning to a consideration of the second question, it is apparent that
contradictory terms appear in the above statute; the word "void" is used
in the headnote, while the body says the contract is not "enforceable."
The law is well settled that the body of the statute controls its meaning.
Although Montana apparently has no cases dealing with the effect of
statute headings, this state has several decision holding that titles of
statutes may be used as an aid in interpreting statutes only if its plain
meaning cannot be determined from the body.25 Moreover, federal cases
hold that headings of statutes, like their titles, are not permitted to gOv-
nREvISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 15-1703. See also R.C.M. 1947, § 15-1701 and
15-1702 for an explanation of the documents and information that must be filed
y the corporation to properly qualify. (Hereinafter Ravisxn CODES OF MONTANA
will be cited R.C.M.)
2BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
"Supra note 4.
24Schluter v. Sell, 194 S.W.2d 125, 128-29 (Tex. 1946). There is a dearth of authority
as to the precise meaning of "enforceable," when used to describe the force and
effect of contracts. Normally contracts are distinguished as either being "void" or
''voidable". However, by the way of analogy, the Schluter case deals with the enforce-
ability of judgments of one state in a different state; this case speaks of "unen-
forceable" judgments as dormant, which could be revived by performing certain
conditions.
"''We concede the rule to be that, if the language of the statute needs construction,
resort may be had to its title as an aid. If the legislative intention can be deter-
mined from the plain meaning of the words of the statute, the court may not apply
other means of interpretation.'' State ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs. v. Bruce, 106 Mont.
322, 77 P.2d 403, 408 (1938). "While the title to the measure might be said to be
more comprehensive than the body thereof, it is the wording of the body and not
that of the title which controls .... ' State ex rel. Jones v. Erickson, 75 Mont. 429,
244 Pac. 287, 296 (1926). See also State ex rel. Palagi v. Regan, 113 Mont. 343,
126 P.2d 818 (1942).
1965]
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ern the meaning of the statute. The United States Supreme Court has held
that:
[H]eadings and titles are not meant to take the place of the de-
tailed provisions of the text. Nor are they necessarily designed
to be a reference guide or a synopsis. Where the text is compli-
cated and prolific, headings and titles can do no more than indi-
cate the provisions in a most general manner; to attempt to refer
to each specific provision would often be ungainly as well as
useless. . . .Factors of this type have led to the wise rule that
the title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit
the plain meaning of the text.
26
One reason for such a rule is that often the headings are not drawn up
by the legislature, but are added in the process of publication. The Cali-
fornia court recognized this fact when it said, concerning one of its
statutes: "The headings to this section are indicated as enclosed in brackets,
and are not to be regarded as official * * * * Evidently they are inserted
in the code by the publisher and as such they are not binding upon the
courts. "
2 7
Even more significant, however, was the statement of the court as it con-
tinued to say that, "Even if the heading of this section were contained
in its official enactment, it would not govern, limit or modify nor in any
manner affect the scope, meaning or intent of said section.
'28
In spite of this general rule that the headings are not controlling,
in the Hutterian case, the federal court interpreted the Montana statute
to mean that contracts made by foreign corporations before qualification
were void.2 9 It is clear that in arriving at this conclusion, a great deal of
weight was given the heading of the statute. In distinguishing the Mon-
tana statute from those of other states, the court said, "the latter [Mon-
tana] statute say that contracts are void if made before compliance with
the act .... ",30 Further, the court continued with the language, "The Mlfon-
tana statute is even stronger because it in express terms declares the con-
tract void. '31 Again, it is imperative to remember that the term "void"
"Blhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & 0. I.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947).
'In re Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d 126, 130 P.2d 384, 386-87 (1942). The heading of the
Montana statute evidently originated through publication of the statute. In the
1901 session law, there is no heading to the bill. Laws of Montana 1901, S.46, § 3,
at 151. This session law later became section 4415 of the 1907 Codes of Montana.
However, this Code section appeared with the heading. There are no session laws
between the 1901 bill and the 1907 Code which adopts the heading as part of the
statute. In 1921, however, the heading was formally incorporated into the statute
by a session law. Laws of Montana 1921, ch. 264, § 2, at 600. Nevertheless, as
stated in the Halcoib case, the body is the controlling part of the statute, even if
the heading was contained in the official enactment of the statute.
'In re Halcoinb, supra note 27.
-'Supra note 5. Although the term "void" was not used, because subsequent qualifica-
tion is not effective, the practical result of the case is to render such contracts com-
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of that statute.
It is also interesting to note that in arriving at this conclusion, the
court began with the proposition that there is "good authority to the
effect that when a foreign corporation deliberately and wilfully violates
a statute of this nature that a compliance with the act years later is not
sufficient and of no avail to the corporate offender. '32 It is significant
that only one Montana case was cited as authority for this rule. That
case was McManus v. Fulton, which contains the comment that "A contract
expressly prohibited by a valid statute is void. This proposition has no
exception, for the law cannot at the same time prohibit a contract and
enforce it." '33 As admitted by the court in Hutterian, the McManus case
does not deal with a foreign corporation. Thus the rights and powers
of the corporation in McManus were in no way determined by the statute
dealing with foreign corporations. On the other hand, the decision in
Ilutterian had to be reached by interpreting this statute, which definitely
calls for a different result than the one arrived at in McManus.
Although not cited by the court in the Jiutterian case, the early de-
cision of Powder River Cattle Co. v. Custer County, said in regard to a
similar matter: "That which is prohibited is the conducting of business;
and, when the law is violated, then all 'acts and contracts' in the conduct
of business are void."'34 Once again, however, this case is not directly in
point, for two reasons: (1) There was never an attempt to qualify; (2)
Since the foreign corporation was bringing suit to recover taxes paid
under protest the suit was allowed because the corporation was not at-
tempting to sue on a contract. Thus, the above quotation was mere
dictum. However, it was undoubtedly a correct interpretation of the law
at that time, since it was based on a statute which stated: "and all acts
and contracts made by such incorporation ... during the time it shall so
fail and neglect to file said statements and certificates, shall be void and
invalid as to such incorporation. '35 In 1901 the wording of this statute
was changed to read, "no contract made by such corporation ... shall be
enforceable by the corporation until the foregoing provisions have been
complied with. '36 This statute, as amended, was re-enacted in 1907,11
1921,38 1935, 3 and again in 1947.40 In each of these re-enactments, the
body of the statute continued to refer to the contracts as not "enforce-
able." In addition to omitting the word "void," the phrase "until the fore-
going provisions have been complied with," was added for the first time
'Id. at 40.
185 Mont. 170, 278 Pac. 126, 130 (1929).
3'Powder River Cattle Co. v. Custer County, supra note 3, at 384.
'"Laws of Montana 1877, 5th div., ch. 24, § 444, at 722.
'Laws of Montana 1901, S. 46, § 3, at 151.
3"Ibid.
'Laws of Montana 1921, ch. 264, § 2, at 600.
Ibid.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 15-1703. See also sections 15-1701 to -1702 for an explanation of the
documents and information that must be filed by the corporation to properly qualify.
1965] NOTES
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in the 1901 session law. These two changes which were included in the
1907 Code, and which continue in the present statute, certainly should
be treated as indicating a change in legislative intent. Nevertheless, the
Hlutterian case followed the broad, general language set forth in the earlier
decisions and declared that such contracts are void.41
In addition to the different terms used in the headnote and the body
of the Montana statute, it is significant that, as mentioned above, it con-
tains the words, "no contracts made by such corporation during said
time, shall be enforceable by the corporation until the foregoing provisions
have been complied with.' '42  (Emphasis added.) The plain meaning of
this phrase would seem to permit qualification at any time after the con-
tract was formed. This interpretation was suggested in Hutterian, but
was rejected, the court saying that, " 'during said time' . . . means during
the time it was required to comply, and during such time such contracts
will not be enforceable, until such foreign corporation does comply, and
compliance must be made before any attempt to do business. * * * * This
seems to be a plain and sensible interpretation of the language of that
section. '43  (Emphasis added.)
According to this explanation, a contract can be entered into without
qualifying, and if, before the corporation "does business" in the state,
it does so qualify, the contract is then enforceable. Once the corporation
begins doing business, qualification will no longer be effective to render
a prior contract enforceable. The court in the Hutterian case does not
explain just how it arrived at the conclusion that "compliance must be
made before any attempt to do business." The wording of the statute
does not require such a conclusion, on the contrary, there is no terminology
whatsoever in the statute limiting this opportunity to a time prior to
the doing of business. A sensible and meaningful interpretation of these
words is that qualification is permitted any time after the contract is
formed.4
4
PURPOSES OF THE STATUTE
Aside from the wording of the statute itself, a more liberal interpre-
tation of R. C. iL. 1947, section 15-1703 can also be justified by examining
the goals or purposes which it is designed to accomplish. Probably the
primary function of the statute is to place a degree of state control on
foreign corporations in an attempt to protect the state's residents from
fraudulent or unduly hazardous corporate activities. Refusing a corpora-
'Supra note 5. There is also authority to the effect that contracts which are not
wrong in themselves nor against public policy, yet which have been declared "void"
by statute for the protection of a certain class of persons, are not actually void, but
merely voidable. BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951); United States v. New
York & Puerto Rico S. S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 93 (1915).
42Supra note 21.
"Supra note 5, at 40-41.
"For the reasons developed in the remaining portion of this discussion, permitting the
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tion the right to sue on a contract is no doubt an effective control, and
should serve as a warning to other corporations which may do business
in Montana in the future. It would seem that the desired control could be
provided merely by charging the corporation with a misdemeanor, as
provided for in R. C. M. 1947, section 15-1705. This of course would result
in a fine levied against the corporation. The same result could possibly
be accomplished even more easily by a late filing fee, assuming the cor-
poration desired to conduct future business in the state, and would so
qualify. Under either of the latter two remedies, the deterrence factor
would still exist, and at the same time, a secondary function of the statute,
that of raising revenue, would be promoted.
Because the same punitive element of that statute is applied to all
situations, the Hutterian rule imposes an unduly harsh penalty where the
failure to comply was the result of a mistake or oversight. Confining the
penalty to a fine and allowing subsequent qualification, would provide a
moderate penalty, and at the same time allow the corporation a method
of correcting its mistake. Also, a rule which encourages the performance
of contracts should have value in attracting foreign corporations into this
state. At least it should improve the state's image in its dealings with
out-of-state firms; and it goes without saying that this "image" is im-
portant to any state desiring to attract new industry.
Under the rule established in the Hutterian case, the party who has
breached the contract, and who may have received all the advantages
and benefits of that contract, is allowed to escape without making any
compensation whatsoever to the foreign corporation. Perhaps the most
desirable aspect of limiting the penalty to a fine, would be the equity
accomplished by holding accountable the person who has breached the
contract. As between the corporation which has finally qualified to do
business, and the second party to the contract, the equities are clearly
in favor of the corporation, since the failure to qualify works no fraud
or hardships on this other party. Also, under the federal court's explana-
tion of the statute, there is always the danger that the second party may
refuse to perform the contract simply because he has learned of the cor-
poration's failure to comply. This is not only an inequitable situation, but
is promotive of an unhealthy business climate.
For the above reasons, it is suggested that when the occasion arises
for Montana to interpret its present qualification statute, it should adopt
a rule permitting foreign corporations to enforce their contracts upon
qualification subsequent to the doing of business, and limiting the penalty
to a reasonable fine, rather than one based on the harsh and incorrect
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